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BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR: 
PRIVATE POLITICAL PARTIES, PUBLIC PRIMARIES, AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS 
Hugh D. Spitzer* 
Abstract: Political parties always disliked the Progressive Era changes that pulled the entire 
electorate into nominating candidates. Why, after all, should non-party members participate 
in the affairs and choices of private organizations? Over the course of a century, Democrats, 
Republicans, and minor parties repeatedly mounted lawsuits to attack new primary laws, and 
they eventually prevailed on a key constitutional issue: the First Amendment right of 
association. But when political actors access the courts for strategic purposes, they can get 
caught in the vagaries of history and public attitudes, with outcomes they might not like. This 
Essay focuses on the history of Washington State’s “direct primary” and “blanket primary” 
systems, the repeated lawsuits challenging them, and the freedom of association doctrine that 
propelled the blanket primary’s 2004 demise. It then recounts the blowback from 
Washington voters, who enacted a “top two” primary system that sidelined the political 
parties by sending the two highest vote-getters to the general election regardless of political 
affiliation. It asserts that remaining aspects of Washington’s election system might violate 
the State’s own constitution, and that things could get worse than ever for the parties, perhaps 
disrupting precinct officer elections and even the state’s presidential primary. How did the 
political parties wind up at odds with their own voters, with an outcome opposite to what 
they intended? This Essay suggests that the answer lies in a web of conflicts: between 
litigation and political strategies; between the federal and state constitutions; and between the 
First Amendment’s protections of freedom of association, the late nineteenth century populist 
constitutional ban on public assistance to private entities, and the early twentieth century 
progressive goal of forcing private political parties to open their processes to the voting 
public. It concludes that long-term litigation strategies to address political issues can fail to 
achieve their objectives when those lawsuits overlook historical policy choices and ignore 
popular sentiments entrenched in the national and state constitutions. 
  
                                                     
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. The author would like to thank Jeffrey T. Even for 
his helpful comments on an earlier draft. While in private practice, the author advised Washington 
State Governor Gary Locke in connection with the veto of legislation discussed in notes 81–83, 
infra. 
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Carefully designed political and litigation strategies can have 
unintended consequences. Litigation decisions made for tactical and 
philosophical reasons can unexpectedly crash into competing legal 
doctrines, political paradigms, and historical forces, with unexpected 
outcomes. 
This Essay is about the unintended consequences of the American 
political parties’ successful legal attack on the “blanket primary” 
nominating system. The analysis focuses on Washington State, where 
for more than a century, Democrats, Republicans, and minor parties 
mounted lawsuits to dismantle Progressive Era nominations processes 
on the grounds that parties are private associations protected by the 
federal Constitution from governmental interference. The Washington 
political parties were not alone in their efforts, which paralleled 
developments in other states, most importantly in California. But in 
Washington, the litigation strategy ultimately led to an outcome that was 
worse from the parties’ standpoint: a wide-open “top two” primary 
system that further diminished party importance. In addition, it appears 
that evolving federal court rulings on the constitutionally protected 
private character of political parties could easily lead to another 
unforeseen consequence: a conflict with the Washington State 
Constitution’s ban on gifts of public funds to private persons.1 Simply 
put, courts hold that in the First Amendment context, political parties are 
private organizations, so they are shielded from most types of 
governmental interference in candidate nominations. However, in 
Washington, this may produce an unintended result: using publicly 
funded elections to choose party precinct committee officers, and 
perhaps presidential primary slates, could violate the state constitution. 
Political parties never liked Progressive Era changes to the candidate 
nominating process that reduced party independence. They repeatedly 
attacked the new primary laws in court over the course of a century, 
initially without much success. The parties’ institutional stance never 
changed, and as First Amendment freedom-of-association doctrines 
evolved, the parties eventually prevailed on key constitutional issues. 
Interestingly, these legal challenges put the political organizations at 
odds with the voters whose support they sought—voters who doggedly 
backed primary mechanisms that allowed them to choose whomever 
they liked, regardless of party. This story highlights the tension between 
federal constitutional doctrines and state-level policy choices, and 
additionally, the tension between competing paradigms of political 
                                                     
1. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 5, 7. 
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institutions and various major policy choices made by voters over time. 
In Washington State, there is observable interplay between the First 
Amendment’s protection for freedom of association, the late nineteenth 
century populist constitutional ban on public assistance to private 
entities, and the twentieth century progressive goal of forcing private 
political parties to open their processes to the voting public. 
Part I describes the rise and fall of Washington’s “direct primary” and 
“blanket primary” systems, the repeated lawsuits challenging them, and 
the freedom of association doctrines that propelled the blanket primary’s 
2004 demise. It describes how Washington voters responded by enacting 
a “top two” primary system that was eventually approved by the United 
States Supreme Court. Part II focuses on the Washington State 
Constitution, reviewing the populist prohibition on spending public 
money for private purposes. Part III details how Washington statutes 
provide private political parties with publicly funded processes to select 
presidential candidates and to select precinct committee officers, the 
lowest level political party officials. But this public funding for private 
purposes might run afoul of Washington’s state constitution. Finally, 
Part IV analyzes these phenomena in terms of conflicts between 
different political philosophies and paradigms over time. These conflicts 
manifest in evolving legal doctrines. The irony is that when political 
actors access the courts for strategic purposes, they can get caught in 
twists and turns of history that they had not foreseen, with results they 
might not like. 
I. DIRECT, BLANKET, AND TOP TWO PRIMARIES, OH MY! 
Nominating processes pick candidates, and voters choose elected 
leaders from among those candidates. In a democracy, nominating 
systems drive the final choices available to the public. The role of parties 
in American nominating processes has evolved over time and among the 
states, but that evolution has always reflected a tension between 
competing interests of party activists, elected officials, and the general 
electorate.2 Until the early twentieth century, political party nominations 
in the United States were typically made by party members (and only by 
                                                     
2. MALCOLM E. JEWELL & SARAH M. MOREHOUSE, POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN 
AMERICAN STATES 100–03 (4th ed. 2001). 
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party members) in local, state, and national conventions.3 In the 
Jacksonian Era, the use of nominating conventions was seen as a 
democratic development encouraging broader participation in political 
parties.4 But by the end of the nineteenth century, parties and their 
nominating processes were widely viewed as undemocratic and under 
the control of corrupt party bosses.5 The University of Chicago political 
scientist Charles Merriam wrote in 1923 that “abuses of the delegate 
system had produced widespread dissatisfaction and a general feeling 
that the nominating conventions did not reasonably reflect the will of the 
party.”6 The progressives “viewed parties . . . as an impediment to 
democracy.”7 
Public dissatisfaction with closely held control of candidacies led to 
political revolution with the widespread adoption of the “direct 
primary.” In direct primaries, voters (typically voters identifying with a 
specific party) themselves nominated the candidates who would then 
stand for office in a general election. By 1923, at least forty-five states 
had adopted the direct primary system.8 In the words of the progressive 
Republican Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska, the “direct primary 
is simply a method by which the will of the people can be ascertained in 
the selection of those who shall make and administer the laws under 
which all of the people must live.”9 The rapid adoption of direct 
primaries in the early twentieth century reflected the progressive 
movement’s emphasis on installing an honest and transparent 
government, strengthening democratic institutions, and reducing the 
power of both the traditional party leadership and industrial and other 
special interest groups.10 For example, in Washington State, 
                                                     
3. Kaori Shoji, Primaries, State and Local Elections, in 2 KENNETH F. WARREN, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF U.S. CAMPAIGNS, ELECTIONS, AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR 671–72 (Kenneth F. Warren ed., 
2008). 
4. THE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 14 (Michael Kazin et al. 
eds., 2010). 
5. R. Laurence Moore, Directions of Thought in Progressive America, in THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 
35, 48 (Lewis L. Gould ed., 1974); ERNST CHRISTOPHER MEYER, NOMINATING SYSTEMS: DIRECT 
PRIMARIES VERSUS CONVENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 40 (1902). 
6. Charles S. Merriam, Nominating Systems, in THE ANNALS: THE DIRECT PRIMARY 1 (Clyde L. 
King ed., 1923). 
7. Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A Reassessment of 
Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 785 (2000). 
8. Charles Kettleborough, Direct Primaries, in THE ANNALS, supra note 6, at 11. 
9. George W. Norris, Why I Believe in the Direct Primary, in THE ANNALS, supra note 6, at 22. 
10. WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS 74–76 (1st ed. 1970). One study reviews the debate among political scientists on the 
extent of anti-party sentiment in causing the shift to direct primaries in the early twentieth century. 
 
10 - Spitzer.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2019  10:49 AM 
2019] BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR 827 
 
progressivism also brought the initiative, referendum, and recall—
constitutional changes meant to reinforce the democratic power of the 
people at large.11 Other reforms were brought about by a coalition of 
Washington State progressives from both major parties.12 These included 
nonpartisan judicial elections in 1907–09,13 women’s suffrage in 1910,14 
workers’ compensation in 1911,15 and approval of a federal 
constitutional amendment establishing popular election of U.S. Senators 
in 1913.16 
States enacting primaries in the early twentieth century differed in 
their approaches. Some jurisdictions opted for “open primaries,” in 
which most voters could participate regardless of formal party 
membership, while other primaries were “closed,” requiring party 
registration or even membership in a political party club.17 For the better 
                                                     
Based on empirical data, that study concludes that Merriam’s contemporary depiction of that 
phenomenon appears to have been accurate. See Eric Lawrence, Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler, 
The Adoption of Direct Primaries in the United States, 19 PARTY POL. 3, 15 (2011). Whatever the 
origins of the direct primary, the impacts were significant, opening up new opportunities for 
aspiring candidates and groups within the political parties. See V.O. Key, The Direct Primary and 
Party Structure: A Study of State Legislative Nominations, 48 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 2 (1954). 
General histories and background on America’s progressive movement are included in RICHARD 
HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955); NANCY COHEN, THE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM, 1865-1914 (2002); and Moore, supra note 5. 
11. See Claudius Johnson, The Adoption of the Initiative and Referendum in Washington, 35 PAC. 
NW. Q. 296 (1944). In Washington State’s initiative system, a petition signed by 8% of the 
registered voters may place proposed legislation directly on the ballot, or the proposed legislation 
may be referred to the legislature either to enact that legislation or send it to the electorate with or 
without an alternative. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(a). With a referendum, the signatures of 4% of the 
voters can force a statute passed by the legislature to be placed before the electorate. Id. § 1(b). The 
recall permits a petition process to force a special election to oust any nonjudicial elected official 
out of office mid-term. Id. art. I, § 33. 
12. Although Washington’s politics was dominated by the Republican Party in the early twentieth 
century, progressive legislators from both parties collaborated in enacting laws associated with the 
progressive movement. William T. Kerr, Jr., The Progressives of Washington, 1910–12, 55 PAC. 
NW. Q. 16, 18 (1964). 
13. Nomination of Candidates for Public Office, ch. 209, 1907 Wash. Sess. Laws 457. A general 
discussion of progressive era legislation in Washington State can be found at Hugh Spitzer, Pivoting 
to Progressivism: Justice Stephen J. Chadwick, the Washington Supreme Court, and Change in 
Early 20th Century Judicial Reasoning and Rhetoric, 104 PAC. NW. Q. 107, 108 (2013). 
14. Act of Feb. 25, 1909, ch. 18, 1909 Wash. Sess. Laws 26 (amending WASH. CONST. art. VI). 
15. Act of Mar. 9, 1911, ch. 74, 1911 Wash. Sess. Laws 345. 
16. H.R.J. Subst. Res. 1, 13th Leg., 1913 Wash. Sess. Laws 678. 
17. See Charles Kettleborough, Digest of Primary Election Laws, in THE ANNALS, supra note 6, 
at 181, 212–21. The open versus closed description is contained at 212–21. According to 
Kettleborough’s chart comparing early twentieth century primary mechanisms, South Carolina 
required membership in a political club to participate in that state’s primary election. Id. at 220. For 
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part of two decades after statehood, Washington parties nominated 
candidates by means of conventions.18 But in 1907, progressives in the 
legislature gained passage of a bill establishing a direct primary system 
for partisan candidates (other than President) and mandating that 
political parties choose most nominees by public primary.19 In that new 
system, separate ballots were printed for each political party, and voters 
could choose the primary ballot for either party. If challenged, voters 
could be required to swear or affirm that they intended to affiliate with 
and support their chosen parties in the general election.20 This 
requirement that voters affiliate with the party in whose primary they 
participated put the 1907 approach somewhat in line with a closed 
primary, restricted to party supporters only,21 although voters were not 
required to pre-register with a specific party as is the case with a true 
“closed primary.”22 Interestingly, Washington Senator George Cotterill, 
a strong progressive supporter of the direct primary,23 protested on the 
Senate floor that requiring an “open declaration of party affiliation as the 
price of participation in a direct primary election is absolutely un-
American,” “bars the door against the independent voter,” and would 
allow party machines to “remain supreme.”24 The electorate appears to 
have been sympathetic to Cotterill’s views. A legislative attempt in 1921 
                                                     
a lively depiction of the historical tension between party regulars and the public, and between party 
conventions and presidential primaries, see Jill Lepore, How to Steal an Election: The Crazy 
History of Nominating Conventions, NEW YORKER, July 4, 2016, at 20. 
18. History of Washington State Primary Systems, WASH. SEC’Y ST.: ELECTIONS, 
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/research/history-of-washington-state-primary-systems.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/A5TM-AQB8]. An excellent summary of the history of Washington primary 
elections from the perspective of a political scientist can be found in Kevin Pirche, Political Parties 
in the Evergreen State, in GOVERNING THE EVERGREEN STATE: POLITICAL LIFE IN WASHINGTON 
45, 46–52, (Cornell W. Clayton et al. eds., 2018). 
19. History of Washington State Primary Systems, supra note 18; Nomination of Candidates for 
Public Office, ch. 209, 1907 Wash. Sess. Laws 457. Section 2 of that law exempted the election of 
presidential electors from the direct primary process. For a description of the progressive or 
“insurgent” movement within the 1907 legislature, see DON BRAZIER, HISTORY OF THE 
WASHINGTON LEGISLATURE, 1854–1963, at 67–69 (2000). 
20. Nomination of Candidates for Public Office, ch. 209, 1907 Wash. Sess. Laws 457, 464. 
21. Shoji, supra note 3, at 671. 
22. Id.; see also History of the Blanket Primary in Washington, WASH. SEC’Y ST.: ELECTIONS, 
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/bp_history.aspx [https://perma.cc/X7KV-FYDR]. 
23. For Cotterill’s political stance and his own contested election, see DON BRAZIER, HISTORY OF 
THE WASHINGTON LEGISLATURE, 1854–1963, at 68–69 (2000), and S. Journal, 10th Leg. at 695–96 
(Wash. 1907). 
24. S. Journal, 10th Leg. at 925–26 (Wash. 1907). 
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to fully close Washington primaries and require party registration to 
participate25 was overwhelmingly rejected by a 1922 referendum.26 
Immediately after its enactment in 1907, the direct primary was 
challenged based on several provisions of the state constitution relating 
to legislative bills, and also on the ground that it interfered with election 
freedom.27 The Washington State Supreme Court upheld the new 
primary law.28 Justice Mark Fullerton’s opinion noted that the plaintiffs 
had also objected that the direct primary tended to destroy political 
parties; he observed that this was “a political, rather than a judicial, 
question” and that appeal must be made to the people rather than to the 
courts.29 
In any event, the 1907 direct primary system lasted fewer than thirty 
years. In 1935, in response to an initiative to the legislature championed 
by labor unions and the state’s largest agricultural advocacy group, the 
Washington State Grange,30 lawmakers enacted a “blanket primary” 
mechanism.31 In the blanket primary, all candidates for a specific office, 
                                                     
25. Act of Mar. 19, 1921, ch. 177, 1921 Wash. Sess. Laws 692. 
26. History of Referendum Measures, WASH. SEC’Y ST.: ELECTIONS, https://www.sos.wa.gov/ 
elections/initiatives/statistics_referendummeasures.aspx [https://perma.cc/M5NJ-S2J3] (Referendum 
Measure 14B); see also Todd Donovan, Elections in Washington, in GOVERNING THE EVERGREEN STATE: 
POLITICAL LIFE IN WASHINGTON, supra note 18, at 23, 24. 
27. Zent v. Nichols, 50 Wash. 508, 523, 97 P. 728, 732 (1908). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. The “Granges of the Patrons of Husbandry” began in 1866 in the Midwest and spread 
throughout the west as a nonpartisan advocacy group for farmers. DOROTHY O. JOHANSEN & 
CHARLES M. GATES, EMPIRE OF THE COLUMBIA: A HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 346–48 
(Dorothy O. Johansen ed., 2d ed. 1967). The Washington State Grange was organized in 1889. It 
was a relatively conservative body self-consciously “composed of the very best people in our land,” 
becoming a powerful political force both during the populist 1890s and the progressive era of the 
early twentieth century. It focused much of its efforts on controlling railroads and large commercial 
interests, and promoting good government, schools, and public services. The Grange also promoted 
an income tax initiative that was approved overwhelmingly in the 1932 election, only to be 
overturned by state supreme court rulings. HARRIET ANN CRAWFORD, THE WASHINGTON STATE 
GRANGE, 1889–1924: A ROMANCE OF DEMOCRACY 14–17, 125–30, 137–43, 159–75 (1940); Harriet 
Ann Crawford, Grange Attitudes in Washington, 1889–1896, 30 PAC. NW. Q. 243, 244–45 (1939); 
Carlos A. Schwantes, Farmer-Labor Insurgency in Washington State: William Bouck, the Grange, 
and the Western Progressive Farmers, 76 PAC. NW. Q. 2, 2 (1985); Hugh Spitzer, A Washington 
State Income Tax—Again?, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 515, 527–28 (1993). 
31. Act of Feb. 21, 1935, ch. 26, 1935 Wash. Sess. Laws 60; see also History of the Blanket 
Primary in Washington, supra note 22. The measure, labeled Initiative No. 2, was filed with a 
sufficient number of signatures on August 21, 1934, and enacted voluntarily by the legislature 
February 21, 1935. Initiatives to the Legislature, WASH. SEC’Y ST.: ELECTIONS, 
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/statistics_initleg.aspx [https://perma.cc/TCR4-H3JR].  
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other than the President,32 were to be listed together with their party 
affiliation indicated. The individual voter could mark his or her ballot for 
any candidate—regardless of party—and the candidate from each party 
receiving the highest number of votes would proceed to the general 
election.33 Under this system, for example, if two Democrats each 
received more primary votes than any Republican, only the top 
Democrat would move on to the general election and face the highest 
vote-getter among the Republicans.34 
The blanket primary was progressive reform on steroids, touted as an 
improvement for voter freedom of choice and allowing electors to 
“vot[e] for the man.”35 But the “old-line party men and their 
organizations” were concerned that supporters of one party would cross 
over and vote in the opposing party’s primary to help select a weak 
opponent.36 Party regulars challenged the blanket primary, but the 
Washington State Supreme Court summarily upheld it in Anderson v. 
Millikan.37 The Court ruled that the key issues had been determined by 
the 1908 ruling sustaining the earlier direct primary law.38 It also 
declared that political parties were neither mentioned nor favored by the 
state constitution and that the blanket primary statute made no attempt to 
                                                     
32. The blanket primary statute amended several sections of the 1907 direct primary law, but left 
in place Section 2 of the Act of Mar. 12, 1907, ch. 209, 1907 Wash. Sess. Laws 457, 457, which 
exempted the process of choosing presidential electors from the direct primary requirement. Act of 
Feb. 21, 1935, ch. 26, 1935 Wash. Sess. Laws 60. 
33. Ch. 26, 1935 Wash. Sess. Laws 60–64. Section 2 of that legislation established a single 
primary election ballot with the names of all candidates, regardless of party, listed together. Voters 
could vote for any of the candidates. The legislation left in place Section 18 of Act of Mar. 18, 
1919, ch. 163, 1919 Wash. Sess. Laws 462, 473, and Section 24 of Act of Mar. 15, 1907, ch. 209, 
1907 Wash. Sess. Laws 457, 469; the net effect was that electors could vote for any candidate, but 
only the highest vote-getter among the Republican candidates and the highest vote-getter among the 
Democrats would proceed to the general election. 
34. Id. This “hypothetical” is precisely what happened in 1996, when Democrat Gary Locke 
received 287,762 votes (23.65%) to Democrat Norm Rice’s 212,888 (17.5%). Locke continued to 
the general election to defeat Republican Ellen Craswell, who had received only 185,680 votes 
(15.26%) in the primary. Election Search Results: 1996 Primary, WASH. SEC’Y ST.: ELECTIONS, 
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/results_report.aspx?e=16&c=&c2=&t=440&t2= 
2&p=&p2=&y= [https://perma.cc/8HZ9-LKSJ]. 
35. Claudius O. Johnson, The Washington Blanket Primary, 33 PAC. NW. Q. 27, 28 (1942); see 
also John Caldbick, Washington State Legislature Approves Grange-Sponsored Blanket Primary 
Initiative on February 21, 1935, HISTORYLINK (Dec. 2, 2013), 
http://www.historylink.org/File/10673 [https://perma.cc/75YZ-ZTPP]. 
36. Johnson, supra note 35; see also Claudius O. Johnson, Washington’s Blanket Primary 
Reviewed, 48 PAC. NW. Q. 113, 113 (1957). 
37. 186 Wash. 602, 608, 59 P.2d 295, 297–98 (1936). 
38. Id. at 603, 59 P.2d at 296 (citing Zent v. Nichols, 50 Wash. 508, 523, 97 P. 728, 732 (1908)); 
see supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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control the power of any political party to adopt its principles or control 
its membership.39 
Over the subsequent years, political life in Washington adjusted to the 
blanket system. One political scientist reported that crossover voting was 
modest, and the parties seem to have survived perfectly well.40 
Nevertheless, party opposition to government interference in their 
internal nominating processes continued, and the Democratic Party 
launched a second attack in 1980 on First Amendment freedom-of-
association grounds. In Heavey v. Chapman,41 the Washington State 
Supreme Court again upheld the blanket primary, balancing the party’s 
associational rights with the state’s interest in controlling and protecting 
the integrity of the electoral process.42 The Heavey Court concluded that 
the plaintiffs had not shown a substantial burden on their associational 
rights and that compelling state interests to support a blanket primary 
included voter interest in keeping party identification secret, 
encouraging broad participation in the primary process, and giving each 
voter a free choice among candidates.43 
The federal constitutional tide finally turned in favor of the political 
parties, which adopted a litigation strategy founded on the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s gradual strengthening of First Amendment freedom of 
association in the election context.44 In 1958, the Court relied on 
freedom of association to strike down an Alabama law that effectively 
barred the NAACP from operating in that state.45 Still earlier decisions 
in the “White Primary” cases held that internal party regulations could 
not operate to exclude African-Americans from participation in primary 
elections.46 Later, in 1975, the Court held in Cousins v. Wigoda47 that 
                                                     
39. Anderson, 186 Wash. at 607–08, 59 P.2d at 297. 
40. Daniel M. Ogden, Jr., The Blanket Primary and Party Regularity in Washington, 39 PAC. NW. 
Q. 33, 34–35 (1948). Ogden’s conclusion is generally consistent with V.O. Key’s research, 
published six years later. See supra note 10. 
41. 93 Wash. 2d 700, 611 P.2d 1256 (1980). 
42. Id. at 701–03, 611 P.2d at 1257–58. 
43. Id. at 704–05, 611 P.2d at 1259. 
44. John R. Labbé, Louisiana’s Blanket Primary After California Democratic Party v. Jones, 96 
NW. U. L. REV. 721, 723–26 (2002). 
45. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958). 
46. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661–64 (1944), held that extensive state involvement in the 
process meant that political parties partook of a sufficient “public” character to require their primary 
election candidate selection processes to be open to voters of all races. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 
461, 469–70 (1953), extended the Allwright principles to encompass primary election processes that 
allowed “private” racially exclusive political clubs to dictate the outcomes of party primary 
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internal state Democratic Party rules, not a primary election state law, 
would determine Illinois delegates to the party’s national convention.48 
The Court’s opinion, by Justice William J. Brennan, stated that the 
“National Democratic Party and its adherents enjoy a constitutionally 
protected right of political association” and that any “interference with 
the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the 
freedom of its adherents.”49 This position was reinforced six years later 
in an opinion by Justice Potter Stewart that upheld the right of the 
Wisconsin Democratic Party to insist that only voters affiliated with that 
party participate in a primary to pick national party convention 
delegates.50 
In 1996, California voters copied Washington by adopting an 
initiative measure that turned the state from a closed partisan primary to 
the blanket primary method.51 Four parties challenged the new system: 
the Democrats, the Republicans, the Libertarians, and the Peace and 
Freedom Party.52 In California Democratic Party et al. v. Jones,53 
writing for a seven-to-two majority, Justice Antonin Scalia restated the 
principal that states may require parties to use primaries to select party 
nominees.54 He then added, “in order to assure that intraparty 
competition is resolved in a democratic fashion,” the First Amendment’s 
freedom of association protects the ability of groups to limit membership 
to those with whom they choose to work.55 He emphasized that “a 
corollary of the right to associate is the right not to associate.”56 Scalia’s 
opinion concluded that political parties have a right to insist that 
participation in their primaries be restricted to those who subscribe to 
their aims.57 The Court held that the state’s expressed interests—
promoting fairness, protecting voter choice, increasing voter 
                                                     
elections. See generally Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A Case Study in the 
Consequences of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55 (2001). 
47. 419 U.S. 477 (1975). 
48. Id. at 487. 
49. Id. at 487–88 (citations omitted). 
50. Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 123–36 (1981). 
51. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 570 (2000). 
52. Id. at 571. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 572. In discussing the legitimacy of state legislation requiring major parties to nominate 
candidates through a primary process, Justice Scalia relied principally on American Party of Texas 
v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974). 
55. Jones, 530 U.S. at 571. 
56. Id. at 574. 
57. Id. 
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participation, and protecting voter privacy—were not compelling under 
the circumstances of that case.58 He then observed that even if those state 
interests were compelling, they were not narrowly tailored because the 
State of California could protect all of those interests “by resorting to a 
nonpartisan blanket primary,” thereby forecasting the top two approach 
that Washington eventually adopted.59 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Jones was consistent with 
earlier decisions on the associational rights of political parties.60 Two 
more decisions have been recently added to the cases described above. 
First, in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,61 
the Court held that a California statute dictating how political parties 
were organized and how leaders were selected unconstitutionally 
burdened their associational rights.62 Later, in Tashjian v. Republican 
Party of Connecticut,63 a state Republican Party that chose to allow 
independents to participate in that party’s primaries successfully 
challenged a statute restricting primaries to registered party members.64 
The Court held that the Republican Party’s associational rights under the 
First Amendment allowed it to decide who could and could not 
participate in its nominating processes.65 
Less than a month after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Jones in 
June 2000, Washington’s Democrats, Republicans, and Libertarians 
resumed their attack on the state’s blanket primary method in federal 
court.66 The Washington Secretary of State, backed by the Grange, 
defended the blanket primary, emphasizing various differences between 
Washington’s and California’s statutes.67 The district court sided with 
the state,68 but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
                                                     
58. Id. at 584. 
59. Id. at 585. 
60. See notes 44–49 and accompanying text. 
61. 489 U.S. 214 (1989). 
62. Id. at 230–31. 
63. 479 U.S. 208 (1986). 
64. Id. at 212. 
65. Id. at 214. 
66. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief Regarding the Washington 
State Blanket Primary at 1, Democratic Party of Wash. State. v. Reed, No. C00-5419FDB, (W.D. 
Wash. July 20, 2000), 2000 WL 35599898. 
67. Democratic Party of Wash. State v. Reed, 343 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 
540 U.S. 1213 (2004) and 541 U.S. 957 (2004). 
68. Democratic Party of Wash. State, 2002 WL 32925223, at *1. 
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the differences between California’s and Washington’s blanket primaries 
were legally insignificant.69 In his opinion, Judge Andrew Kleinfeld 
wrote that the “Washington scheme denies party adherents the 
opportunity to nominate their party’s candidate free of the risk of being 
swamped by voters whose preference is for the other party” and further 
wrote that the blanket primary “prevents those voters who share their 
affiliation from selecting their party’s nominees.”70 
The political parties’ long-term litigation strategy appeared to have 
succeeded when this Ninth Circuit decision overturned Washington’s 
nearly seventy-year blanket primary system. But the wide open, vote-
for-anyone primary was an approach to which voters had become 
accustomed and liked.71 When legislators were faced with designing a 
replacement in the 2004 session, they received strong pressure from the 
general public and media to approve a substitute that retained primary 
voters’ ability to vote for any candidates, regardless of those voters’ 
party affiliations.72 One political scientist suggests that Washington 
voters continued to prefer a blanket-type primary “as a mechanism both 
to reduce the power of the political parties and to encourage more 
moderate, centrist candidates.”73 At the same time, party officials 
expressed strong dislike for any system that allowed voters to cross party 
lines in primaries.74 In response to voter preferences, some members of 
the Washington House proposed a “top two” system, also known as the 
“Louisiana” primary.75 In the top two system, now used in just four 
                                                     
69. Democratic Party of Wash. State, 343 F.3d at 1206–07. 
70. Id. at 1204. 
71. Background documents on the blanket primary, including historical materials and polling 
data, are available at The Blanket Primary, WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE: ELECTIONS, 
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/blanket_primary.aspx [https://perma.cc/3RUE-KWR6]. 
72. Editorial, Governor Should Sign New Primary into Law, EVERETT HERALD (Mar. 11, 2004, 
9:00 PM), https://www.heraldnet.com/opinion/governor-should-sign-new-primary-into-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/4QEZ-QRJG]; see also Press Release, Wash. Sec’y of State, Polls Favor Modified 
Blanket Primary (Jan. 28, 2004), https://www.sos.wa.gov/office/news-releases.aspx#/news/231 
[https://perma.cc/3HEF-U67K]. 
73. Pirch, supra note 18, at 47. 
74. Id. at 48. 
75. The Louisiana blanket primary, first implemented in 1975, allows an elector to vote for any 
candidate regardless of the voter’s party affiliation, with the two candidates receiving the largest 
number of votes preceding to the general election. The Louisiana system was implemented because, 
in 1975, an overwhelming percentage of that state’s voters were Democrats. The new system 
provided more choice and offered a simplification of the previous mechanism, which was a three-
step election process that itself had its origin in the overwhelmingly Democratic character of 
Louisiana’s politics for many years. Labbé, supra note 44, at 742–44. 
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states,76 the two candidates with the most votes proceed to the general 
election regardless of political affiliation. But when the top two 
approach was proposed in Washington’s legislature, partisan forces 
threatened to derail it in court.77 During the legislative process, after the 
House adopted a top two bill, Washington’s Senate amended the 
legislation to add a back-up plan to take effect if a political party 
challenge were successful.78 That alternative would install a primary 
similar to the one adopted back in 1907. Dubbed the “pick-a-party”79 or 
“Montana” primary,80 voters could pick the option of voting either in the 
Democratic or the Republican primary but could not switch back-and-
forth on different races. 
Washington’s Governor at the time, Gary Locke, who like many party 
activists disliked the top two system, vetoed the sections of the 
legislation that would have implemented that approach,81 leaving only 
the pick-a-party primary.82 The Grange responded with its own lawsuit 
                                                     
76. The top two primary system, originating in Louisiana, is now used in California and 
Washington as well, and in Nebraska only with respect to Nebraska’s non-partisan legislature. State 
Primary Election Types, NAT’L CTR. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 26, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/primary-types.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y7AL-
LD4R]. 
77. M. L. Madison, Area Party Leaders Criticize “Top Two” Primary Bill, TDN (Mar. 13, 2004), 
https://tdn.com/business/local/area-party-leaders-criticize-top-two-primary-bill/article_7bdf7625-
0c0c-5ef6-bb38-d40b7a8d504b.html [https://perma.cc/G55M-M4AT]; Neil Modie & Angela 
Galloway, Locke Vetoes Election Plan: Voters now Face Separate Party Primaries this Fall, 
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 1, 2004, 9:00 PM), https://www.seattlepi.com/local/a 
rticle/Locke-vetoes-election-plan-1141277.php [https://perma.cc/28MY-RKMM]. 
78. Act of Apr. 1, 2004, ch. 271, 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws 1172. Section 101 of the bill was a 
transition section that would have substituted the “Montana” primary for the top two approach if a 
court of competent jurisdiction held the top two version to be unconstitutional. Id. at 1202. See 
Wash. State Grange v. Locke, 153 Wash. 2d 475, 479–86, 105 P.3d 9, 12–15 (2005) for a 
description of the circuitous route the legislation took in the state legislature.  
79. For an example of use of the term “pick-a-party,” see A Timeline of Voting and Elections in 
Washington State, WASH. SEC’Y OF ST., https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/timeline/time5.htm 
[https://perma.cc/59JX-8B6X]. 
80. The “Montana” approach was modeled on a system earlier implemented in that state. Wash. 
State Grange, 153 Wash. 2d at 11–12, 105 P.3d at 478–79.  
81. Washington’s constitution permits the governor to veto not only entire bills, but also 
individual sections of legislation, or individual appropriation items in appropriations bills. WASH. 
CONST. art. III, § 12. 
82. Press Release, Office of Governor Gary Locke, Gov. Gary Locke Signs Bill Enacting 
Montana Primary Election System (Apr. 1, 2004), 
https://www.digitalarchives.wa.gov/governorlocke/press/press-view.asp?pressRelease=1575&news 
Type=1 [https://perma.cc/LG86-M8YQ]. The text of Governor Locke’s veto message is available at 
ch. 271, 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1241–43; see also Modie & Galloway, supra note 77. 
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challenging the Governor’s veto, but in Washington State Grange v. 
Locke,83 the Washington State Supreme Court upheld the legislation as it 
had emerged from the Governor’s cutting table. 
The pick-a-party primary favored by the political parties was short-
lived. It went into effect for the 2004 primary, but that year a solid 
majority of the electorate indicated their dislike for the system.84 The 
Grange roared back with Initiative No. 872, the “People’s Choice 
Initiative of 2004” (“I-872”) which passed with nearly 60% of the vote.85 
The initiative replaced the pick-a-party system with the top two 
approach that Governor Locke had earlier vetoed. The political parties 
promptly challenged the top two primary on familiar grounds, arguing 
that it was indistinguishable from the blanket primary found in Jones to 
violate their associational and free speech rights under the First 
Amendment.86 The federal district court in 2005,87 and then the Ninth 
Circuit in 2006,88 sided with the political parties. The Ninth Circuit 
opinion held that because I-872 permitted candidates to identify 
themselves as favoring one party or another, the measure “severely 
burdens the Washington political parties’ associational rights.”89 
Two years later, in Washington State Grange v. Washington State 
Republican Party,90 the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision and upheld the I-872 top two system by a seven-to-two vote. In 
his opinion for the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas pointed out that 
unlike the blanket primary, I-872 did not choose party nominees—it 
simply advanced the top two primary candidates to the general election 
ballot even if both of them were in the same party.91 The Court also held 
that the initiative did not impose a severe burden on the political parties’ 
associational rights and that the parties’ arguments rested “on factual 
assumptions about voter confusion that can be evaluated only in the 
                                                     
83. 153 Wash. 2d 475, 105 P.3d 9 (2005). 
84. See History of the Blanket Primary in Washington, supra note 22. 
85. The initiative is entitled the People’s Choice Initiative. See The People’s Choice Initiative of 
2004, ch. 2, 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 9. For a breakdown of the 2004 election results, see OFFICE OF 
THE SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL NOVEMBER 2, 2004 GENERAL ELECTION ABSTRACT 9 (2004), 
https://wei.sos.wa.gov/agency/osos/en/press_and_research/PreviousElections/2004/Documents/200
4%20General%20Election/2004Leg-CongDistAbstract.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5NP-ECWJ]. 
86. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, Wash. State Republican Party v. Logan, 377 
F. Supp. 2d 907 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (No. CV05-0927-TSZ). 
87. Logan, 377 F. Supp. 2d 907. 
88. Wash. State Republican Party v. Washington, 460 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2006). 
89. Id. at 1124. 
90. 552 U.S. 442 (2008). 
91. Id. at 453. 
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context of an as-applied challenge.”92 The political parties continued to 
battle away at the top two system, using the same litigation (with 
shifting case names) to raise issues of voter confusion, associational 
rights, compelled speech, and trademark claims, among others.93 These 
arguments were eventually rejected by the Ninth Circuit in 2012,94 
leaving the political parties precisely where they never wanted to be. 
After successfully deploying a litigation strategy to gain both federal and 
state court95 recognition of their private status and associational rights, 
their attempt to eliminate the blanket primary ultimately forced them to 
live with something worse: a primary election method that would 
sometimes result in two general election candidates of the same party—
perhaps the other party. 
But the future could hold additional unpleasant surprises for the 
parties. 
II. THE POPULIST ERA AND PROHIBITED GIFTS OF PUBLIC 
FUNDS 
As described above, Washington State’s political parties fought the 
1907 direct primary, then the blanket primary three decades later, and, 
finally, the top two method. Notwithstanding the parties’ attempts to 
maintain control over the selection of their own candidates, the 
Progressive Era ideals of open government and direct voter participation 
were reinforced and augmented with each iteration of Washington’s 
                                                     
92. Id. at 444. 
93. The winding path of the litigation included, from the beginning, the following decisions: 
Wash. State Republican Party v. Logan, 377 F. Supp. 2d 907, 924–25 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (issuing 
an initial preliminary injunction against implementation of a top two system on the grounds that it 
unconstitutionally interfered with the political parties’ associational rights); Wash. State Republican 
Party v. Washington, 460 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court’s preliminary 
injunction); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (reversing 
the preliminary injunction and rejecting the facial challenge to the top two primary); Wash. State 
Republican Party v. Wash., 545 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2008) (implementing the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision); Wash. State Republican Party v. Grange, No. C05-0927-JCC, 2011 WL 92032 (W.D. 
Wash. 2011) (granting summary judgment rejecting an as-applied challenge); Wash. State 
Republican Party v. Grange, 676 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming and upholding the top two 
system from the as-applied challenge). 
94. Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. State Grange, 676 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 568 U.S. 814 (2012). 
95. The Washington State Supreme Court underscored the private associational rights of political 
parties in Pilloud v. King Cty. Republican Cent. Comm., 189 Wash. 2d 599, 404 P.3d 500, 502 
(2017), where the court found that a statute requiring parties to elect rather than appoint legislative 
district chairs violated the Republican Party’s freedom of association. 
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nominating process. The good news for the parties is that after more than 
a century of litigation efforts, the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes them 
as truly private associations with the right to be substantially free from 
government interference. The bad news for the parties is that voters have 
remained so keen on “voting for the candidate” rather than voting for a 
party that, in Washington, primaries have partially transformed into non-
partisan affairs. 
But things could get still worse for the Washington’s political parties, 
because of a provision in the state constitution rooted in populism, the 
movement that immediately preceded and influenced progressivism. 
Populist ideas permeate the Washington State Constitution.96 A 
majority of the delegates to the state’s 1889 constitutional convention 
had a populist outlook, regardless of political party.97 They were 
suspicious of railroads, banks, and commercial interests generally; 
supportive of farmers and working people; and they strongly favored 
constitutional restrictions on government handouts to the private 
sector.98 These attitudes were typical of Washington’s predominantly 
agricultural residents in the late nineteenth century and led to the success 
of the People’s Party (also known as the “Populist Party”) in 
Washington’s 1896 election.99 In fact, one of the most active 
organizations in Washington politics during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries was the Washington State Grange,100 the same 
farmers’ group that spearheaded the blanket primary in 1935.101 
Among the key anti-corporate provisions of Washington’s 1889 
constitution were three sections banning state and local government 
gifts, loans, and credit support to the private sector—article VIII, 
sections 5 and 7, and article XII, section 9.102 Although worded 
differently,103 all three constitutional sections were propelled by anti-
                                                     
96. See generally Hugh Spitzer, Washington: The Past and Present Populist State, in THE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN STATES 771 (George E. Connor & Christopher W. Hammons 
eds., 2008). 
97. Id. at 773. 
98. Id. at 774–76. 
99. Id. at 774. 
100. Id. 
101. See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text.  
102. James M. Dolliver, Condemnation, Credit, and Corporations in Washington: 100 Years of 
Judicial Decisions—Have the Framers’ Views Been Followed?, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 163, 
168–69, 182–85 (1989). 
103. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 states: “The credit of the state shall not, in any manner be given 
or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual, association, company or corporation.” WASH. CONST. 
art. VIII, § 7 provides:  
No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall hereafter give any money, or 
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railroad sentiment104 and they have been interpreted and applied 
identically.105 Of particular relevance here is the flat prohibition on gifts 
of public funds. 
The source of the anti-gift provision was a desire to firmly separate 
the public and private sectors and to prevent business misuse of taxpayer 
dollars.106 But early in the state’s history, the Washington State Supreme 
Court declined to restrict the clause’s application to transfers of public 
funds to for-profit enterprises, holding that a county’s cash donation to a 
private nonprofit fair association to operate a county fair violated the ban 
on gifts to private organizations, except in aid of the poor and infirm.107 
As a result, the governmental arrangement with fair associations was 
reconfigured by statute so that counties could “employ persons to assist 
in the management of such fairs,” thus enabling them to contract with 
the private parties and pay them in exchange for specific services.108 
Over the years, the Washington State Supreme Court elaborated on what 
characterizes an unconstitutional gift, defining it as a “voluntary transfer 
of property without consideration,”109 and then as “a transfer of property 
without consideration and with donative intent.”110 At the same time, 
“[r]eceipt of valuable consideration assures that a transaction is not a 
                                                     
property, or loan its money, or credit to or in aid of any individual, association, company or 
corporation, except for the necessary support of the poor and infirm, or become directly or 
indirectly the owner of any stock in or bonds of any association, company or corporation. 
WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 9 states: “The state shall not in any manner loan its credit, nor shall it 
subscribe to, or be interested in the stock of any company, association or corporation.”  
104. Dolliver, supra note 102, at 184–85. 
105. Citizens for Clean Air v. Spokane, 114 Wash. 2d 20, 40, 785 P.2d 447, 458 n.8, (1990); 
Wash. Health Care Facilities v. Ray, 93 Wash. 2d 108, 115–116, 605 P.2d 1260, 1264 (1980).  
106. See ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION 162–
63 (G. Alan Tar ed., 2d ed. 2013); Dolliver, supra note 102, at 190. 
107. Johns v. Wadsworth, 80 Wash. 352, 354, 141 P. 892, 893 (1914). 
108. Act of Jan. 8, 1917, ch. 32, 1917 Wash. Laws 103. Interestingly, House Bill 97, the 1917 
legislation permitting counties to employ persons to assist in county fair management, was referred 
to the House Committee on Agriculture but was then re-referred to the Committee on Judiciary, 
which later reported it back to the full House “with the recommendation that it is, in our opinion, 
constitutional.” H. Journal, 15th Sess., 180 (Wash. 1917). This suggests some initial uncertainty 
about the effectiveness of the statutory “fix” for the 1914 ruling in Johns. 
109. State ex rel. O’Connell v. Port of Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d 801, 804, 399 P.2d 623, 625–26 
(1965). 
110. Louthan v. King County, 94 Wash. 2d 422, 428, 617 P.2d 977, 981 (1980). 
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gift.”111 The Washington State Supreme Court has been fairly deferential 
to elected officials’ determinations of adequacy of consideration.112 
Further, a transaction is not deemed a gift if the transfer of public 
money, property, or services is an incidental effect of government 
carrying out one of its fundamental purposes or public functions. For 
example, in Johnson v. Johnson,113 the Washington State Supreme Court 
held that spending government funds to collect child support from a 
delinquent parent carries out the recognized public function of protecting 
children.114 But that function or purpose must be “fundamental,”115 and it 
is not deemed adequate consideration simply because a transfer of public 
assets or credit is seen as generally useful or might have future public 
benefits.116 The potential problems are accentuated when there is an 
identifiable private recipient of an expenditure of public funds, as 
opposed to the public at large.117 Early in the state’s history, the 
Washington State Supreme Court held that a county’s donation to a 
private nonprofit association to operate a fair violated the state 
constitution’s ban on gifts of public funds. In Johns v. Wadsworth,118 the 
Court stated: “[t]hat agricultural fairs serve a good purpose is not 
questioned, but the Constitution makes no distinction between purposes, 
but directly and unequivocally prohibits all gifts of money, property, or 
credit to, or in aid of any corporation,” except to aid the poor and 
infirm.119 A concurring opinion added: “[t]he grant in question is of 
obvious public benefit. The terms of the quoted provision of the 
Constitution are, however, so clear and explicit as to leave no room for 
construction.”120 While the Court has subsequently approved various 
government transfers to private persons in exchange for sufficient 
                                                     
111. Id. 
112. See, e.g., King County v. Taxpayers of King Cty., 133 Wash. 2d 584, 597–601, 949 P.2d 
1260, 1267–68 (1997) (holding a professional baseball team’s minimal annual rent payment to a 
public authority did not constitute an unconstitutional gift of the use of a ballpark because those 
payments were accompanied by a substantial array of other forms of consideration). 
113. 96 Wash. 2d 255, 634 P.2d 877 (1981). 
114. Id. at 267–68, 634 P.2d at 884. 
115. Taxpayers of King Cty., 133 Wash. 2d at 624, 949 P.2d at 1280. 
116. Lassila v. Wenatchee, 89 Wash. 2d 804, 812–13, 576 P.2d 54, 59 (1978).  
117. Compare id. (city had unconstitutionally provided credit support by purchasing property to 
re-sell to a specific private developer), with United States v. Town of North Bonneville, 94 Wash. 
2d 827, 830–37, 621 P.2d 127, 129–32 (1980), (municipality purchased a tract of land in order to 
make it available to its residents, generally, who were being flooded out and displaced by a new 
reservoir). 
118. 80 Wash. 352, 141 P. 892 (1914). 
119. Johns v. Wadsworth, 80 Wash. 352, 354, 141 P. 892, 893 (1914). 
120. Id. at 357, 141 P. at 894.  
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consideration,121 the basic prohibition on uncompensated transfers of 
public money and assets remains solidly in place.122 
III. ARE PUBLICLY FUNDED ELECTIONS OF PARTY 
OFFICIALS AND PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL GIFTS IN WASHINGTON STATE? 
This Part now applies the Washington State Constitution’s ban on 
public gifts to private persons to two specific uses of public funds and 
processes: first, to elect political party precinct offers, and second, to 
select presidential candidates for the major political parties. 
In Jones,123 the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated that political parties, as 
private associations, have the right to determine who can and cannot 
vote in their candidate selection processes; states may not interfere with 
internal party functions without a compelling state interest.124 This was 
reiterated in the Ninth Circuit’s decision to overturn Washington State’s 
blanket primary125 and further reinforced by the federal district court’s 
opinion in Washington State Republican Party v. Washington State 
Grange,126 which upheld the I-872 top two primary. But Washington 
State Grange separately held that the application of the top two approach 
                                                     
121. See, e.g., King County v. Taxpayers of King Cty., 133 Wash. 2d 584, 949 P.2d 1260 (1997) 
(finding below-market rent of baseball stadium acceptable because of other sufficient 
consideration); Scott Paper Co. v. City of Anacortes, 90 Wash. 2d 19, 578 P.2d 1292 (1978) 
(holding provision of water to private manufacturer at below-market rates permitted because of a 
contractual bargain was adequate consideration); Ayers v. City of Tacoma, 6 Wash. 2d 545, 108 
P.2d 348 (1940) (finding payment of pension amounts not a gift, but compensation for prior 
services). 
122. For examples of the continued vitality of the prohibition of gifts of public funds, see 
Authority of Rural County to Use Special Sales Tax Revenues to Pay for Installation of Fiber Optic 
Cable for Privately-Owned Electrical Utility, AGO 2002 No. 1 (Mar. 18, 2002), 
https://www.atg.wa.gov/ago-opinions/authority-rural-county-use-special-sales-tax-revenues-pay-
installation-fiber-optic [https://perma.cc/2638-MMC6] (concluding that as a private entity nonprofit 
electrical cooperative cannot receive tax money from government to fund equipment for installation 
of fiber optic cable); State ex rel. O’Connell v. Port of Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d 801, 803–07, 399 P.2d 
623, 625–27 (1965) (finding that expenditures of public funds for the entertainment of shippers, 
business people, and other private individuals constitute unconstitutional gifts). 
123. 530 U.S. 567 (2000). 
124. See supra notes 51–58 and accompanying text. 
125. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. 
126. No. C05-0927-JCC, 2011 WL 92032 (W.D. Wash. 2011), aff’d, 676 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 
2012). The political party plaintiffs did not appeal the district court’s ruling on the PCO issue. 
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to party offices such as precinct committee officers (“PCOs”)127 violated 
the right of parties to control their internal affairs. In his opinion, 
U.S. District Court Judge John C. Coughenour cited the rulings in Eu 
and Tashjian, emphasizing that “voters in the partisan ‘party preference’ 
races are selecting individuals to serve as members of a government 
office; voters in the PCO races, on the other hand, are selecting 
individuals to serve as members of the political parties. This distinction 
is critical.”128 Judge Coughenour also relied on Arizona Libertarian 
Party, Inc. v. Bayless,129 where the Ninth Circuit held that allowing 
nonmembers to vote for party precinct committee-people violated the 
Libertarian Party’s associational rights.130 
After Judge Coughenour’s ruling barred use of the top two system for 
precinct committee officers in Washington State, the political parties 
worked with legislators to redesign the PCO-selection system so it 
would pass constitutional muster. In 2012, the Washington legislature 
enacted statutory amendments with the express intent “to remedy the 
unconstitutional method of selecting precinct committee officers by 
implementing a provision requiring voters to affirm an affiliation with 
the appropriate party in order to vote in a race for precinct committee 
officer in that party.”131 As the bill worked its way through the 
legislature, testimony from opponents (including the Grange) observed 
that political parties are private, that PCOs are not public officers, and 
that taxpayers should not be required to pay the cost of PCO elections.132 
The legislation declared that “the office of precinct committee officer 
itself is both a constitutionally recognized and authorized office with 
certain duties outlined in state law and the state Constitution.”133 
However, this declaration is without foundation in the text of the state 
constitution. While the Washington State Constitution mentions 
                                                     
127. Precinct committee officers are the lowest officials positions within the major parties. In 
Washington, as in many states, PCOs are responsible for connecting with individual voters on the 
precinct level, distributing campaign literature, and getting out the vote on election day. PCOs also 
participate in choosing higher level party officials and convention delegates. Become a Precinct 
Committee Officer, WASH. ST. DEMOCRATS, https://www.wa-democrats.org/local/pco 
[https://perma.cc/UH8S-M429]; Lane Covington, Become a Republican Precinct Committee Officer 
Today!, KING COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY (May 10, 2018), https://www.kcgop.org/blog/become-
a-republican-precinct-committee-officer-today/ [https://perma.cc/T8J4-AB39]. 
128. Wash. State Republican Party, 2011 WL 92032, at *9. 
129. 351 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2003). 
130. Ariz. Libertarian Party, Inc. v. Bayless, 351 F.3d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir. 2003). 
131. Act of June 7, 2012, ch. 89, 2012 Wash. Sess. Laws 682. 
132. H.B. Rep. E3SHB 1860, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. at 3 (Wash. 2012); S.B. Rep. E3SHB 1860, 
62d Leg., Reg. Sess. at 3 (Wash. 2012). 
133. Act of June 7, 2012, ch. 89, 2012 Wash. Sess. Laws 682. 
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precincts or precinct “officers” in six sections, none of those provisions 
outline duties, and all but one appear to refer to precinct level public 
positions such as election officials; the single reference to PCOs clearly 
distinguishes those party positions from true public offices.134 The point 
is that there is scant constitutional support for the notion that PCOs are 
public officials of any kind. They are ground-level party officials, and 
rulings such as Judge Coughenour’s in Washington State Republican 
Party v. Washington State Grange and the Ninth Circuit’s in Bayless 
reinforce the understanding of PCOs as officers of non-governmental 
private associations.135 
The independent, non-governmental character of political parties and 
their officers was underscored by the Washington State Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Pilloud v. King County Republican Central 
Committee,136 which overturned a statute requiring parties to elect rather 
than appoint legislative district chairs. Pilloud was decided on the 
grounds that internal operations are a political party’s own business and 
that the statute violated the Republican Party’s freedom of association.137 
Chief Justice Mary Fairhurst’s opinion further held that there was no 
compelling state interest for the government’s interference in internal 
party governance.138 The Washington State Supreme Court’s recognition 
of the fundamentally private character of political parties might be a 
victory for the First Amendment associational rights of parties, but it 
also has state constitutional implications for Washington laws that result 
in the expenditure of public money on the internal proceedings of those 
private political groups. 
                                                     
134. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 34 refers to the recall of public officers at the precinct level; WASH. 
CONST. art. II, § 6 mentions the filling of vacancies in public office at the precinct level; WASH. 
CONST. art. VI, § 1 refers to voter residency within a precinct; WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 5 mentions 
county officers at the precinct level; WASH. CONST. art. XXVII, § 14 states that public officials at 
the precinct level, among others in office upon statehood, are to serve until their successors are 
qualified. Only WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(3) expressly refers to precinct committee officers, and 
that reference is to allow PCOs to serve on the state redistricting commission; in other words, PCOs 
are expressly distinguished from officials in public office. It should be noted that political parties 
are mentioned in WASH. CONST. art. II, § 15, which requires that when vacancies occur in partisan 
elective offices, those offices must be filled by appointment from a three-person list nominated by 
the relevant county central committee of the departed office holder’s political party. 
135. See supra notes 124, 127 and accompanying text. 
136. 189 Wash. 2d 599, 603–04, 404 P.3d 500, 502 (2017). 
137. Id. at 604–06, 404 P.3d at 502–03.  
138. Id. at 606, 404 P.3d at 503.  
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Notwithstanding the judicial recognition of political parties as private 
organizations, Washington statutes—particularly the statute passed with 
party support in 2012139—continue to treat parties as quasi-public, and 
PCOs as some type of government officers. For example, state law 
mandates that PCOs be registered voters,140 elected at primary elections 
in even-number years141 to serve two-year terms.142 Another statute 
provides that county central committees of political parties consist of 
those elected PCOs.143 It is hard to imagine that these provisions would 
survive a challenge along the lines of Pilloud. For example, what if the 
Democratic Party of Washington were to change its bylaws to provide 
that its county central committees must consist of members elected by 
precinct-level Democratic clubs, that resident non-citizens were entitled 
to join those clubs and serve as PCOs, and that PCO terms would last 
four years? If Washington courts remained consistent with Pilloud, it is 
probable that they would sustain the authority of the Democratic Party to 
control its internal organization however it pleased—notwithstanding the 
PCO statutes. 
The flipside of the federal and state cases on political party 
independence is that to the extent that those private organizations 
continue to make use of biennial public primary elections to choose their 
officers—without paying for county-level election costs—the counties 
could readily be viewed as spending public money for private purposes. 
This is the logical extension of a case like Johns,144 which barred 
transferring public money to a county fair association without 
consideration. This potential problem could be remedied by legislation 
providing that political parties can contract to pay an allocable share of 
primary election costs in return for access to the ballot. But without such 
an adjustment, a successful constitutional challenge is still possible. 
That raises the issue of the presidential preference primary in 
Washington State. That primary is a curious beast. Historically, the 
state’s political parties formed their national convention delegations 
purely through caucus and district convention processes.145 The 1907 
direct primary law exempted presidential primaries,146 and this was not 
                                                     
139. Act of June 7, 2012, ch. 89, 2012 Wash. Sess. Laws 682. 
140. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.80.041 (2018). 
141. Id. § 29A.52.171. 
142. Id. § 29A.80.051. 
143. Id. § 29A.80.030. 
144. See supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text. 
145. See Pirche, supra note 18, at 52–53. 
146. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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changed by the 1935 blanket primary initiative.147 Then, in response to a 
1988 initiative to the legislature declaring that the party caucus system 
was “unnecessarily restrictive of voter participation,”148 the legislature 
created a presidential preference primary in 1989. That measure required 
that the results of a presidential primary determine the allocation of 
delegate positions among presidential candidates.149 It also required that 
all costs of presidential primaries be provided by the state rather than at 
the local level.150 In 1995, the legislature made it optional for parties to 
use the primary results to allocate their delegates,151 attempting to 
address the conflict between internal party rules and the interest in 
conducting a presidential primary.152 But Washington State’s political 
parties have preferred caucuses and have been reluctant to award many 
delegates based on presidential primary results.153 Because the parties 
planned to entirely ignore the 2004 presidential primary results, the 2003 
legislature cancelled the 2004 preferential primary—a venture that 
would have cost six million dollars with no appreciable impact.154 
Washington’s current presidential preference primary statute continues 
to allow the parties to either use, or ignore, preferential primary 
results.155 It was suspended again in 2012 to save money after the parties 
decided to rely on their caucuses to allocate delegates.156 In 2016, 
Republicans used it to allocate some of their convention delegates while 
Democrats ignored it entirely.157 That proceeding cost Washington State 
                                                     
147. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
148. Act of July 23, 1989, ch. 4, 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws 23. Initiative to the Legislature No. 99 was 
filed in 1988 with 202,872 signatures. Rather than going to the voters, the Legislature enacted it on 
March 31, 1989, as ch. 4, 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws 23. See Initiatives to the Legislature, supra note 31. 
149. Act of July 23, 1989, ch. 4, 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws 23. 
150. Id. 
151. Act of Apr. 23, 1995, ch. 20, 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws 2519. 
152. S.B. Rep. ESB 5852, 54th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. at 2–3 (Wash. 1995). The 1995 legislation 
was also intended to provide flexibility in conforming Washington State’s presidential primary with 
national party scheduling rules. Id. 
153. Donovan, supra note 26, at 28. 
154. H.B. Rep. HB 2297, 58th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. at 2 (Wash. 2003). 
155. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.050 (2018). 
156. See Act of May 12, 2011, ch. 319, sec. 1(5), 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws 2064; Washington State 
Cancels 2012 Presidential Primary, SEATTLE TIMES (May 12, 2011, 5:59 PM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/washington-state-cancels-2012-presidential-primary/ 
[https://perma.cc/KX5P-U2KE]. 
157. Donovan, supra note 26, at 28. Donovan points out the interesting fact that Hillary Clinton 
won a majority of the Democratic preferential primary votes, but activists attending party caucuses 
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in excess of $ 8.4 million.158 For the 2020 presidential nominating 
process, both parties opted to use the state-sponsored presidential 
preference primary to choose their respective convention delegates.159 
Does the Washington presidential primary procedure violate the 
state’s constitutional ban on gifts of public funds to benefit private 
entities? That is a closer question than the PCO issue. Every four years 
the state seems to sponsor an event and invite “guests” (the major 
political parties). But those guests are not required to attend the 
celebration and have exhibited lackluster interest in doing so. Therefore, 
it is more difficult to establish that the parties truly benefit from the 
preferential primaries. They are perhaps like the children in the Johnson 
child support case, i.e., indirect beneficiaries of what is a “recognized 
public function” that they can choose to attend (or not).160 The 
counterargument is that under the relevant statute, the political parties 
play a substantial role in setting the presidential primary date161 and can 
direct some of the secretary of state’s rulemaking for those elections.162 
Moreover, if the parties were to consistently participate in and actively 
exercise control over the preferential primaries, a successful state 
constitutional challenge might be mounted, based on the gift-of-public-
funds theory.163 
                                                     
had already determined that a majority of Washington’s Democratic delegation would be pledged to 
Bernie Sanders. 
158. E-mail from Erich R. Ebel, Commc’ns Dir., Office of Wash. Sec’y of State, to Hugh D. 
Spitzer, Professor of Law, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law (June 27, 2018, 8:33 AM) 
[https://perma.cc/DT5V-ZPJR]. 
159. David Gutman, Washington Democrats Choose Presidential Primary for 2020, Ditching 
Precinct Caucuses, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 7, 2019, 11:34 AM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/washington-democrats-choose-presidential-
primary-for-2020-ditching-caucuses/ [https://perma.cc/54HK-2PTJ]. 
160. Johnson v. Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d 255, 264, 634 P.2d 877, 882 (1981); see supra notes 113–
114 and accompanying text. 
161. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.020 (2018). 
162. Id. § 29A.56.050. 
163. Another challenge might be mounted against the major parties’ use of the presidential 
primary for their private purposes based on article I, section 12 of the Washington State 
Constitution, which provides that no statute may grant privileges or immunities to any class of 
citizens or corporations “which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or 
corporations.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12. The argument might be that because WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 29A.56.010–.060 together with §§ 29A.56.610–.620 provide state-funded access to the “major 
parties” but not “minor parties,” the smaller and new parties are harmed by the privilege and state 
funding handed to the established private political groups. “Major parties” are those receiving at 
least 5% of the votes in the prior presidential election. Id. § 29A.04.086. 
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IV. LITIGATING IN A LAND OF CONFLICTING PROVISIONS 
FROM DIFFERENT HISTORICAL MOVEMENTS 
What is to be made of the major parties’ stubborn misunderstanding 
of the voters they had worked so hard to attract, and their use of tactics 
that backfired so decidedly? Back in 2000, when Washington State’s 
political parties relaunched their legal attack on the blanket primary after 
Jones, they were reacting to a U.S. Supreme Court opinion that was 
based on America’s First Amendment clause protecting speech and 
association.164 At first, in 2003, the parties seem to have succeeded, 
overturning the blanket primary in Democratic Party v. Reed.165 
But the political parties might not have taken into sufficient account 
the political and constitutional resiliency of statutes and constitutional 
provisions embedded in Washington law by two intervening 
movements: populism and progressivism. Both of those movements 
were skeptical of politicians and the established political parties,166 as 
well as business interests.167 The progressives undertook a concerted 
effort to diminish the importance of parties and to force the parties to 
open their processes to the public. Those efforts included the 1907 direct 
primary law, which was popular among voters. In 1922, the electorate 
rejected closed primaries where they would have to register by party.168 
They similarly embraced the Grange-sponsored blanket primary in 
1935.169 
Political scientists have observed that political culture can be “path 
dependent,” meaning that practices remain stable over time “even 
though the forces that shaped them initially may have dissipated.”170 But 
                                                     
164. See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. 
165. Democratic Party of Wash. State v. Reed, 343 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2003); see supra notes 
66–70 and accompanying text. 
166. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text. An 1894 cartoon asks: “In Which Box Shall the 
Voter of ‘96 Put His Ballot?” The three choices presented are: “Republican Party, Builders of 
Corporate Wealth,” “Democratic Party, Builders of Saloons and Jails,” and “People’s Party, 
Builders of Churches and Schools.” In Which Box Will the Voter of ‘96 Put His Ballot?, Kingfisher 
Reformer (Nov. 29, 1894), http://courses.missouristate.edu/bobmiller/Populism/scartoon 
/scartoon33.htm [https://perma.cc/6XQD-U2A2]. 
167. See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text. 
168. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.  
169. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
170. Nicolas P. Lovrich Jr., John C. Pierce & H. Stuart Elway, Two Washingtons? Political 
Culture in the Evergreen State, in GOVERNING THE EVERGREEN STATE: POLITICAL LIFE IN 
WASHINGTON, supra note 18, at 1, 2. 
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in this instance, Washington voter commitment to wide-open election 
practices has not dissipated at all. The state’s open government attitude 
can be traced to its populist constitution, later accelerated by 
progressivism.171 Political customs (including the initiative, referendum, 
and recall, for example172) are often entrenched in constitutions or 
statutes by an active political movement. Those provisions then play a 
key role in reinforcing and continuing that movement as an ongoing part 
of a state’s political life. This has been described by Professor Robert A. 
Schapiro, who has cogently shown how electoral supermajorities 
enshrine their values in state constitutional provisions and then those 
provisions themselves help generate ongoing political customs and 
community.173 Professor Nicholas P. Lovrich recently elaborated on how 
entrenched political values continue from one generation to the next: 
“An area’s political culture tends to be learned by newcomers and 
sustained by long-time residents, and thereby comes to have an ongoing 
impact on politics and policy.”174 
Washington’s open approach to primaries has had remarkable staying 
power because, decade after decade, voters insist on maintaining an 
election system that enables them to vote for pretty much whomever 
they want, whatever they want, whenever they want. This attitude, 
founded in populism and progressivism, is also reflected in the state’s 
resilient initiative and referendum process,175 as well as voter insistence 
on electing judges.176 In Washington, the open government political 
culture seems to have only gained strength over the years. When the 
political parties embarked on a successful legal strategy to eliminate the 
blanket primary and replace it in 2004 with one that required primary 
voters to opt for one party or the other,177 the state’s popular political 
culture recoiled on the parties, throwing out both the baby and the 
bathwater, putting the top two system in place.178 The bottom line is that 
                                                     
171. See supra notes 6–16 and 94–98 and accompanying text. 
172. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
173. Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REV. 
389, 393 (1998). 
174. Lovrich et al., supra note 170, at 2. 
175. Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, Max Neiman & Johnny Peel, Institutional Threat and 
Partisan Outcomes: Legislative Candidates’ Attitudes Toward Direct Democracy, 1 STATE POL. & 
POL’Y Q. 364, 370 (2001). 
176. Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan & Janine Parry, Public Reasoning About Judicial Selection 
Methods 20 (paper presented at the Westerm Political Science Association meeting in Vancouver, 
B.C., 2009). 
177. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
178. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.  
10 - Spitzer.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2019  10:49 AM 
2019] BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR 849 
 
litigation approaches to solving political problems have limitations.179 
With a strong enough political culture and strong enough tools in the 
hands of voters, the public can sometimes reverse what initially appears 
to be a “win” in the courts—even a win based on the First Amendment 
of the Federal Constitution. 
The political parties’ failure to foresee the ultimate political outcome 
of their litigation strategy for primary elections was in part because the 
party activists’ worldview was different from that of the voters at large. 
In a thoughtful analysis, Professors Nathaniel Persily and Bruce E. Cain 
have observed some contradictions among court decisions on the role of 
American political parties in the election process—contradictions that 
reflect a half dozen competing and very different paradigms.180 These 
include, among others, a long-dominant “managerial” paradigm in which 
“states had near plenary authority to regulate political parties” for the 
preservation of political order,181 a “libertarian” approach that viewed 
parties as private interest groups to “be accorded maximal rights of 
association,”182 and the early twentieth century “progressive paradigm” 
that viewed parties as impeding democracy and the supremacy of the 
electorate.183 Washington State political party activists probably leaned 
toward yet another of Persily’s and Cain’s paradigms: a “pluralist” view 
emphasizing group-based competition built into two major parties that 
serve as coalitions of interest groups.184 That approach protects the role 
of parties as private, but indispensable, mediating institutions in 
American politics.185 Yet the party officials driving the litigation strategy 
hopped on board the “libertarian” trend of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
recent freedom-of-association decisions as a tactic to gain freedom from 
state interference in the nominating processes. 
What the party activists missed was that Washington State voters 
remained ensconced in the Progressive Era. The electorate was 
                                                     
179. For a general discussion of the limitation of litigation strategies in carrying out political and 
social goals, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008). 
180. Persily & Cain, supra note 7, at 779. 
181. Id. at 779–82. 
182. Id. at 782–85. 
183. Id. at 785–87. 
184. Id. at 793–94. Obviously, the Libertarian Party, which was active in some of the Washington 
cases discussed above, would have had Persily’s and Cain’s “libertarian” worldview rather than 
viewing the political world through a lens that focused just on two major parties. 
185. Id. at 779, 791–96. 
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overwhelmingly wedded to a progressive paradigm and had no interest 
in changing. The various lawsuits,186 the shifting primary election 
methods,187 and the ultimate decision by voters to throw the partisan 
baby out of the primary bathwater,188 shows that in a democracy a 
significant disconnect between political leadership and the voters at 
large will eventually result in what the voters want. 
Another important conclusion is that political leaders, including party 
leadership, must be mindful of state constitutions. Just as the late 
eighteenth century drafters of the Bill of Rights wrote in strong 
protections for speech and association, the populist drafters of 
Washington’s state constitution—people who took the Bill of Rights for 
granted but had other immediate concerns—built in very different types 
of provisions a century later. Those state provisions were meant to 
protect the public and the public purse from exploitation by business 
interests. Entrenched provisions can come back and bite. In this instance, 
it is conceivable that article VIII, sections 5 and 7, which ban spending 
public money for private sector purposes, could be the legal basis for 
eliminating the use of taxpayer-funded primaries for electing PCOs, who 
are private political party officers. It is also conceivable—though less 
likely—that Washington courts could find the preferential presidential 
primary violates the state’s ban on gifting public funds. 
 
*   *   * 
 
When political actors access the courts for strategic purposes, they 
can get caught in unforeseen twists and turns of politics, including 
different policy choices embraced by society at different points in 
history and then entrenched into statutes and constitutions. This does not 
at all mean that citizens and organized groups should avoid using the 
judicial system to further legitimate goals. However, political insiders in 
a democracy must plan their tactical moves—including use of 
litigation—with an eye towards the much broader political context and 
broad public desires. Otherwise, they risk having things turn out quite 
different from what they had intended. 
                                                     
186. See notes 66–95 and accompanying text. 
187. See notes 72–83 and accompanying text.  
188. See notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
